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DICTA
Curative Statutes of Colorado Respecting
Titles to Real Estate
By PERCY S. MORRIS,
of the Denver Bar
EDITOR'S NOTE: This is the concluding portion of Mr. Morris' classic, the first half
of which appeared in the November DICTA. The whole article is a revision of the one
originally published on this subject by Mr. Morris in the February and March 1939
DICTA. An alphabetical index to all subject heading in both installments appears at
the conclusion on pages 339 and 340.
LIMITATIONS-MAY BE ASSERTED AFFIRMATIVELY. At common law a
statute of limitations is a shield and not a sword; it can at common law be
asserted only by way of defense against an action brought by another and
not affirmatively as basis for an action. However, 1927 S. L. 604, Sec. 41,
1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Sec. 148, provides that the limitations "herein provided
for" (evidently meaning the limitations provided in the entire Chapter 150
of the 1927 Session Laws) may be asserted either affirmatively or by way of
defense and may be used in any action as a source of, or as a means to, es-
tablish title or the right of possession or as an aid or explanation of title and
that actions may be maintained affirmatively to establish the limitations pro-
vided in said Chapter 150 of the 1927 Session Laws. In Federal Farm Mort-
gage Corporation v. Schmidt, 109 Colo. 467, 473, 126 Pac. (2d) 1036, our
Supreme Court said that it is true that, as a general rule of law, statutes of
limitation are held to be available only as a matter of defense or bar to the
bringing of an action, but that, because of the provisions of this section, the
general rule had no application. It held the. General Assembly had the
power to pass such legislation and that, having in mind the intent and pur-
pose of the entire 1927 Act, permission to assert affirmatively the limitations
contained therein included such as are found in the sections discussed herein
under the heading Decrees, Judgments and Official Deeds.
LIMITATIONS-PERSONS UNDER DISABILITY. Many of the curative stat-
utes herein discussed are statutes of limitation which make no exception in
the 6ase of minors, mental incompetents or others under legal disability.
That these statutes operate to bar the rights of all persons, whether under
legal disability or not, seems clear from the decision of our Supreme Court
in a case involving a limitation contained in the Workmen's Compensation
Act, in which the Court held that, unless specific exception is made in the
statute of limitations in favor of those under disability, courts are without
power to add such exception. Miller v. Industrial Commission, 106 Colo.
364, 367, 105 Pac. (2d) 404. A fortiori, a statute such as 1935 C.S.A.
Ch. 40, Sec. 147, mentioned under the heading Decrees, Judgments and
Official Deeds, which imposes upon persons under legal disability a limitation
period which is two years longer than the one imposed upon persons not
under legal disability, is unquestionably valid.
MECHANIC'S LIENS. One of the most perplexing problems of attorneys
ekamining titles has been the situation where a mechanic's lien claim was
filed of record a long time before the examination and the abstract shows no
release of the lien claim and nothing indicating any suit brought to fore-
close it. The statutes have always imposed a limitation of six months after
the completion of the entire work within which to bring the suit to foreclose
a mechanic's lien, and under the decisions, if the suit was not brought within
that period, the lien was lost. However, if the suit had been brought within
that period, then the lien was preserved until the determination of such suit
and, if such determination was one which sustained the lien, then such lien
continued thereafter indefinitely. An attorney might check the records in
the offices of the Clerk of the County Court and the Clerk of the District
Court of the county wherein the real estate was situated and might ascertain
from same that no suit to foreclose the lien had been brought in either of
said courts. Nevertheless the Supreme Court in Fletcher v. Stowell, 17
Colo. 94, 28 Pac. 326 and Burton v. Graham, 36 Colo. 199, 84 Pac. 978 held
that a suit respecting real estate may be brought in any county in the state
subject only to the right of a defendant to move for a change of venue and,
if no such motion is made, the court has full jurisdiction. Therefore, so far
as the examining attorney could know, a suit might have been brought in any
one of the sixty-three counties in the state to foreclose the lien and such suit
might still be pending, or a judgment sustaining the lien may have been
entered although not followed by any recording of a certified copy of the
judgment or a Sheriff's Certificate of Purchase or a Sheriff's Deed. To remedy
this situation a statute was passed in 1915 (1915 S. L. 333; 1921 Comp.
Laws, Sec. 6451; 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 101, Sec. 24) which provided that, in
order to hold the lien, the suit must not only be commenced within said
period of six months but a notice of lis pendens must be filed within that
period in the office of the Recorder of the county wherein the land involved
is situated. However, in the case of Laverents v. Craig, 74 Colo. 297, 225
Pac. 250, the Supreme Court in effect nullified this provision, holding, be-
cause of certain phraseology in the statute and because of the general nature
of lis pendens, that the filing of the lis pendens was required by the statute
only for the "protection of third parties who might deal with the property
in ignorance of the contractor's claim" and that the lis pendens is "not a neces-
sary prerequisite of a suit where the action is against the owner of the
property, or one primarily liable for the debt". This left for the title at-
torney the problem as to how his client could "deal with the property in ignor-
ance of the contractor's claim" when the abstract showed a notice of the lien
of the contractor. In order to remedy this situation a statute was passed by
the 1937 Session of the Legislature (1937 S. L. 481, Sec. 4; 1935 C.S.A.
Suppl. Ch. 101, Sec. 24) changing in various respects the phraseology of
the previous statute so as to make it more clear and explicit and adding the
words "as against the owner of the property or as against one primarily liable
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for the debt upon which the lien is based or as against anyone who is neither
the owner of the property nor one primarily liable for such debt." To ex-
tend these provisions to lien claims filed before the passage of the statute,
there was at the same time adopted a new section (1937 S. L. 482, Sec. 5; 1935
C.S.A. Suppl. Ch. 101, Sec. 24 (1)). This provides that no lien statement filed
for record prior to the date when such section took effect shall "as against
the owner of the property or as against one primarily liable for the debt
upon which the lien is based or as against anyone who is neither the owner
of the property nor one primarily liable for such debt," hold the property
longer than one year after the date when such section took effect, unless
an action shall have been commenced prior to the expiration of said one
year to enforce the same and unless also, prior to the expiration of said one
year, there shall have been filed for record with the Recorder of the county in
which the property is situated either a notice stating that such action has been
commenced, or a certified copy of a decree or judgment enforcing such lien
rendered in such action, or a certificate of purchase evidencing the purchase of
the property at a sale thereof made pursuant to the provisions of a decree or
judgment rendered in such action, or a deed conveying the property under such
a sale.
MORTGAGES. See Liens-Extinguishment of; and Limitations-Lien Barred
when Indebtedness is Barred.
NAMES, VARIANCES IN. When a man or a woman executes a conveyance
of or an encumbrance upon real estate, he or she is often not particular as
to whether his or her name, as it appears in the paper he or she signs, is
identical with his or her name as it appeared in the instrument by which
the title was acquired. As the result, attorneys have been plagued with
questions such as: Is the title acquired by a deed to John T. Jones conveyed
by a deed naming him as J. T. Jones, or vice versa? Is the title acquired by a
deed to J. T. Jones conveyed by a deed naming him as J. Thomas Jones, or
vice versa? The decisions, either of the Colorado courts or of the courts
outside Colorado, did not settle these questions. So in 1941, there was
enacted a statute (1941 S. L. 607-608; 1935 C.S.A. Suppl. Ch. 40, Sec. 117
(4)) which provided that variances between any two instruments affecting
the title to the same real property, both of which shall have been of record
for more than three years in the office of the Recorder of the county in which
such real estate is situate, with respect to the names of persons named- in the
respective instruments or acknowledgments thereto or in the signatures thereto
in the particulars hereinafter mentioned, irrespective of which one of the
two instruments was prior in point of time to the other and irrespective of
whether the instruments were executed or originated before or after the time
when the statute took effect, shall not destroy or impair the presumption that
the person so named in one of said instruments was the same person as the
one so named in the other which would exist if the names in the two in-
struments were identical. Such statute further provided that, in spite of any
such variance, the person so named in one of said two instruments shall be
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presumed to be the same person as the one so named in the other until such
time as the contrary appears and, until such time, either or both of such in-
struments or the record thereof or certified copy or copies of the record
thereof shall be admissible in evidence in the same manner as though the
names in the two instruments were identical. The variances which are
mentioned in the statute as not impairing the presumption that would exist
had the names been identical are the following: (1) The full Christian name
appearing in one instrument and only the initial letter of that Christian name
appearing in the other; (2) the full middle name appearing in one instru-
ment and only the initial letter of that middle name appearing in the other;
and (3) the initial letter of a middle name appearing in one and not in the
other. The statute further stated that the word "instruments" as used therein
means not only instruments voluntarily executed but also papers filed or issued
in or in connection with actions and other proceedings in court and orders,
judgments and decrees entered therein and transcripts of uch judgments and
proceedings in foreclosure pursuant to powers of sale. In Title Standard No.
18 it was stated that names in birth certificates, death certificates and mar,
riage certificates are within the -effect of this statute. It is to be noted that
the curative effect of this statute is limited to the three respective situations
above listed and that the statute does not operate to remedy defects existing
from other variances in names or from the combination in the same name of
two of the variances mentioned in the statute. For example, after both in-
struments have been of record for more than three years, the name J. T.
Jones appearing in one of them could, under this statute, be presumed to
designate the person named in the other instrument as John T. Jones or as
J. Thomas Jones or as J. Jones, but could not, under such statute, be pre-
sumed to designate the person named in the other instrument as John Thomas
Jones. However, where both instruments have been of record for more than
twenty years, many defects caused by variances in names which are not cor-
rected by the operation of this 1941 statute may be remedied by the opera-
tion of the 1927 statute discussed under the heading "Recitals Prima Facie
Evidence," especially where the later of the two instruments is a warranty
deed containing the customary recitals that the grantor is the owner of the
property and has good right, full power and lawful authority to convey the
property. And, although it does not belong in an article on curative statutes,
the writer cannot resist the urge to make the statement at this point that
many variances in names which are not covered by the two statutes that
have been mentioned may be disregarded if the instrument executed by the
person in question contains an acknowledgment in proper form naming him
by the proper name. See Patton on Titles, page 213, Section 53 and
Chivington v. Colorado Springs Co., 9 Colo. 597, 604, 14 Pac. 212.
OFFICIAL DEEDS. See Decrees, Judgments and Official Deeds; and Offi-
cial Sales.
OFFICIAL SALES. It sometimes is found that a Sheriff's Certificate of
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Purchase or a Public Trustee's Certificate of Purchase was recorded and no
Sheriff's Deed or Public Trustee's Deed was ever executed and recorded based
upon such sale. Because of this there were passed in 1937 two sections
(1937 S. L. 472-473, Secs. 1 and 2; 1935 C.S.A. Suppl. Ch. 40, Secs. 164
and 164 (1)). Said Section 164 included a new provision that the deed shall
be issued by the Trustee, Sheriff or other official within nine months from
the expiration of the last period of redemption and not thereafter. Said Sec.
164 (1) provides that, if the person entitled to the deed shall not apply for
the deed within such nine months or if no such deed be issued to him within
such period, all rights under the Certificate of Purchase, including any rights
of any lienor who has redeemed therefrom, shall terminate, and no person
shall be entitled to receive such deed, and the ofcial who made the sale shall
not have the power to execute such deed. Such section then provides: that
after such nine months the holder of the Certificate of Purchase, if no re-
demption has been made, or the lienor last redeeming shall have a lien on
the property sold superior and prior to all liens and encumbrances recorded
subsequent to the recording of the lien on which the sale was based, for the
amount which would have been necessary to redeem the property on the
last day of the last period of redemption, plus interest thereon and all taxes,
insurance premiums and other lawful and proper charges advanced or paid
by such person; that such lien may be enforced only by an action com-
menced in the proper court to foreclose the same in the manner and method
provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages; that such lien shall
continue in effect only for fifteen months from the date when such person
became entitled to a deed; and that after the expiration of such fifteen months,
if no action to foreclose such lien has been commenced and no lis pendens of
such action has been filed as provided by law, then it shall conclusively be
presumed that such lien has been paid and discharged and no release or other
acquittance shall be necessary or required to discharge such lien. Such sec-
tion further provides: that in cases where the property had been sold before
the section took effect, and the party entitled to a deed had not received it,
he may apply for such deed and receive it within nine months from the
date that said section became effective; that, if he fails to do so, then he
may commence an action within fifteen months from the c1hte when the
section became effective to foreclosure such lien and not thereafter; and that,
if no action to foreclose such lien has been commenced and no lis pendens
of such action has been filed as provided by law within such fifteen months,
then it shall be conclusively presumed that such lien had been paid and dis-
charged and no release or other acquittance shall be necessary or required to
discharge such lien. In Green v. Hoefler, 115 Colo. 287, 290-291, 173 Pac.
(2d) 208, our Supreme Court held that, the holder of the Certificate of
Purchase having made no demand for a deed, and having brought no action
to foreclose, and having filed no lis pendens, within fifteen months after the
first date when she became entitled to a deed, it must, under the mandate
of this statute, conclusively be presumed that the lien evidenced by the
Certificate of Purchase had been paid and discharged and that her action
thereafter was barred by the limitation of this statute.
OPTIONS TO PURCHASE. Previous to 1927 considerable difficulty was
encountered through the owner of property having given an option to pur-
chase the property, which option was recorded but no sale and conveyance
thereunder was ever consummated. Such options constituted clouds upon the
title because the fact that they were of record gave notice of possible rights
of the optionee. Anyone dealing with the property was put upon the
duty of inquiring as to whether the optionee had, in accordance with its terms,
tendered performance and payment. Therefore in each such case it was
necessary to secure a quit claim deed from the optionee or to quiet title.
To remedy these situations there was in 1927 enacted a section (1927 S. L.
591, 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Sec. 116) which provided that recorded instru-
ments of the nature of an option to purchase, affecting title to real property,
under the terms of which possession is "not delivered to the purchaser, *shall
not constitute notice to any person for a period of more than one year after
the time specified .therein for the conveyance of the property and that after
the expiration of such period such instrument shall cease to be notice to any
person for any purpose. Such section further provided that all such instru-
ments which shall have been recorded prior to the time the section took
effect shall constitute notice only for one year from the time the section goes
into effect or for one year from the time in said instruments specified for
performance, whichever of the two times shall be the later, and thereafter
the same shall cease to be notice to any person for any purpose. Such sec-
tion contained the proviso that if, prior to the expiration of said beriod,
legal notice of the pendency of an action be filed for record, then such in-
strument and lis pendens shall continue to be notice until three months after
the final termination or disposition of the suit. It is to be noted that the
provisions of this section relate only to instruments "of the nature of an
option to purchase * * * under the terms of which instruments possession
is not delivered to the purchaser." Therefore, the provisions of this section
do not apply to the customary form of a contract of sale under the terms
of which the purchaser makes a down payment and thereafter makes periodi-
cal payments and during the period of the making of such payments he is
entitled to possession of the property. Particular attention should be given
to whether the instrument in question is of the nature of an option to pur-
chase, or is of the nature of a binding contract for the sale and purchase, and
to whether, by the terms of the instrument, possession of the property is
delivered to the purchaser.
PUBLIC TRUSTEES. See also: Decrees, Judgments and Official Deeds;
Estates-Foreclosure of Deeds of Trust against; Liens-Extinguishment of;
Public Trustee's Sales--Place of Sale; Releases before Maturity; Releases of




PUBLIC TRUSTEE'S SALES-PLACE OF SALE. When the present Denver
City and County Building was built and occupied and the old Court House
was vacated and shortly thereafter torn down, the situation arose of most
deeds of trust, which had been previously executed, having prescribed that
the place of sale thereunder should be either the encumbered premises or the
Tremont Street front door of the Court House. Since there was no longer any
Tremont Street front door of a Court House in Denver, this situation was
the subject of some discussion among the attorneys. Accordingly, there were
passed in 1933 four sections (1933 S. L. 793-794, 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Secs.
58-61) which made valid sales by Public Trustees, both those previously made
and those made in the future, where they were or are made at the Bannock
Street main entrance to the new City and County Building in Denver or at
the door, side or entrance of the Court House which shall have been de-
stroyed or removed or the site thereof otherwise changed or at the door,
side or entrance of any new Court House or any building or place tempo-
rarily serving as a Court House or at the place specified in the trust deed, even
though the Court House was not there maintained at the time of the sale or
at any door, side or entrance of the new City and County Building in Denver
or at any door, side or entrance of a new Court House or building or place
temporarily used for a Court House. They provided a limitation of ninety
days after the sections took effect for the bringing of a suit or proceeding
based upon a claim that the sale was held at the place designated in the
trust deed which was no longer at the time of the sale a Court House, or
upon the ground that such sale was held at a place not designated in the
trust deed but which was then actually a Court House.
RECITALS PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE. Occasionally in examining a title it
is found that-there is a defect in the title which requires, in order to correct it,
the perpetuation of testimony or a declaratory judgment to establish certain
facts or a suit to quiet title and it is found that certain recitals in instruments
of record set out the required facts. In the absence of a statute, these recitals
would not constitute any evidence but would be self-serving declarations or
hearsay. Believing that, where an instrument in the chain of title to a piece
of real estate contains a recital of certain facts and such instrument has been
of record a long time without anyone bringing any legal proceeding to
challenge the truth of such facts, such recitals should be admissible in evidence
as prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts set forth therein, a statute
was passed in 1927 (1927 S. L. 589; 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Sec. 112). It pro-
vided that all recitals contained in instruments affecting title to real estate,
which have remained or shall have remained of record in the office of the
Recorder of the county where the real property affected is situated for a
period of twenty years, shall be accepted and received as prima facie evidence
of the facts recited therein, except as to recitals which are mentioned herein
under the heading Reference to another Instrument. This statute is the
basis for Title Standards Nos. 19, 51 and 59.
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RECORDING A LONG TIME AFTER EXECUTION OF INSTRUMENT. Very
often in examining a title an attorney finds that a deed was not recorded
until a long time after its execution. In 1928 our Supreme Court in its
decision in Larison v. Taylor, 83 Colo. 430, 442, 266 Pac. 217, said: "There
is no presumption of the delivery of a deed where it is not recorded until
long after its date." This immediately placed a serious question upon the
validity of any deed which had not been recorded until long after its date.
It also, in connection therewith, imposed upon examining attorneys the re-
sponsibility of passing upon the question of what period would constitute
"long after its date," which to the writer is very much like the question
"How long is a piece of string?"It also raised the question of whether, assuming
that the deed had not been recorded until long after its date, the defect
occasioned thereby would be corrected by any lapse of time after it was
recorded and, if so, how long a lapse of time is required. This decision was
probably the cause of attorneys receiving more money in fees for bringing
suits to quiet title than any other event in the history of the Colorado bar.
To remedy this situation there was passed by the 1937 Session of the Legis-
lature (1937 S. L. 477) an amendment of 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Sec. 107,
the section prescribing the form of acknowledgment and the effect thereof.
This amendment, as corrected by an amendment passed by the 1939 Ses-
sion (1939 S. L. 289-290; 1935 C.S.A. Suppl. Ch.. 40, Sec. 107), re-
enacted the previous statute except that at the end of the last paragraph
of the section it added the following language: "irrespective of the length
of time that may have elapsed between the date of such instrument and the
date when such instrument was so recorded. The provisions hereof shall
relate and apply to all instruments which shall have been executed prior to
the time when this section takes effect, as well as to all instruments which
are executed after the time when this section takes effect, irrespective of
whether such instruments shall have been acknowledged before or after the
time when this section takes effect and irrespective of whether such instru-
ments are recorded before or after the- time when this section takes effect."
REFERENCE TO ANOTHER INSTRUMENT. Previous to 1927 attorneys had
a great deal of trouble through recorded instruments in the chain of title
containing a reference to some other instrument which either was not of
record or, if of record, was not correctly described in the reference. This
trouble arose most frequently through incorrect description of an encum-
brance of record; for example, a deed of record might contain a provision
that it was "subject to a mortgage of $2,000.00." In such case there might
be of record no mortgage securing $2,000.00 [but there might be of record
a deed of trust securing $2,000.00or an encumbrance, either trust deed or
mortgage, which originally secured $2,500.00 which amount had at the time
the deed was executed been reduced to $2,000.00. The attorneys felt that
there was serious danger of it being held that a deed of trust was not a
"mortgage" or that, in view of the difference in the amount of the encum-
brance mentioned in the deed and the amount of the encumbrance of record,
it might be claimed that the one did not refer to the other, with the result
that the recital in the deed might be taken to refer to an instrument which
had not been recorded and put everyone dealing with the property on notice
that there was an unrecorded "mortgage of $2,000.00." And it was felt that
in other cases the reference in an instrument to some other instrument, where
the latter was not of record, would put each person dealing with the prop-
erty upon notice of the existence of such unrecorded instrument, with the
duty of pursuing an investigation to ascertain the terms of such unrecorded
instrument, with the consequent clouding of the title. To remedy this situa-
tion there was passed in 1927 a section (1927 S. L. 589; 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40,
Sec. 113) providing that, when an instrument affecting title to real estate
shall have been recorded and contains a recitation of or reference to some other
instrument purporting to affect title to said property, such recitation or refer-
ence shall bind only the parties to the instrument and shall not be notice to
any other person whatsoever, unless the instrument mentioned or referred
to in the recital be of record in the county where the property is situated and,
unless it is so recorded, no one other than the parties to the instrument shall
be required to make any inquiry or investigation concerning such recitation or
reference and that, as to recitations or references contained in instruments
recorded prior to the time when the statute took effect, the same shall, after
the expiration of one year from the date when the statute took effect, cease
to be notice unless the instrument referred to in the reservation, exception or
reference be actually recorded within said one-year period. In Rocky Moun-
tain Fuel Company v. Clayton Coal Company, 110 Colo. 334, 340, 134 Pac.
(2d) 1062, our Supreme Court held that this section was conclusive on the
point that a reference in a recorded lease to an unrecorded contract of sale
bound only the parties to the lease and was not notice to any other person
whomsoever.
RELEASES BEFORE MATURITY. In the old days many attorneys questioned
whether the fact that a release was executed before the maturity of the in-
debtedness secured by a trust deed did not put any subsequent purchaser or
encumbrancer upon inquiry as to whether the note secured by the trust deed
was owned by the original payee at the time of the release or, if it had been
transferred to someone else before maturity, as to whether the then owner
of the note had requested the execution of the release. Accordingly, in 1893
there was passed a section (1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Sec. 83) providing that
the recital in any release or partial release of a deed of trust of the payment
or partial payment of the indebtedness secured by such triust deed shall, as
to subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers of the property mentioned in the
release, be evidence of such payment so as to give full effect to such release
when such release was executed before maturity of said indebtedness, if the
release was duly and legally executed by the proper trustee according to the
purport thereof, to the same extent and with the same force as the release of
any trust deed when executed after the maturity of the indebtedness.
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RELEASES OF TRUST DEEDS-To WHOM MADE. Until comparatively re-
cent years it had been uniformly held by the Supreme Court that, although
a mortgage constituted only a lien, a deed of trust with power of sale con-
veyed to the trustee the legal title to the property. See decisions cited under
the heading Trust Deeds Merely Liens herein. Therefore, in a case where
the maker of the deed of trust afterwards conveyed the property by quit
claim deed and the subsequent release with its usual words of conveyance of
title, as well as of release, was made to the person who had executed the
deed of trust instead of to the then owner, such release conveyed to the
original owner the naked legal title to the property, leaving his grantee own-
ing only an equitable title. Becanse of this, very often in cases of this kind
examining attorneys required quit claim deeds from the original owners.
Because of this situation, in 1893 a section was adopted (1935 C.S.A. Ch.
40, Sec. 84), providing that all releases of deeds of trust theretofore or
thereafter made shall be good and valid as to the recitals therein, whether
made to the original maker of said deed or to a subsequent purchaser of the
premises in such release described, and there was adopted in 1927 a section
(1927 S. L. 593; 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Sec. 120) providing that all instru-
ments executed for the purpose of releasing any lien or encumbrance against
real property shall be considered only as discharging and cancelling such lien
or encumbrance and that no such release shall convey to any person except
the record owner of the property any right, title or interest in the property
and that words of conveyance used in any such release shall be construed
only as in such section provided.
REPRESENTATIVES. See Decrees, Judgments and Official Deeds; Estates-
Commenced in Wrong County; Estates-Sales in, not to be Invalidated;
Signatures of Those Acting in Representative Capacity; Successors in Trust;
Trustees; and Wills-Powers of Sale under.
SEALS. Under the common law a seal was required on every instrument
conveying or encumbering real estate. No practical purpose is under present-
day practice served by the requirement that a seal be so affixed and it very
often is found that an instrument affecting the title to real estate was executed
and recorded which did not contain near the signature the word "Seal" or
any other form of seal and it was quite uncomfortable to an examining at-
torney to have to turn down the title because of the omission of this formality.
Accordingly, in 1917 there was adopted a statute (1917 S. L. 161, Sec. 5;
1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Sec. 15) providing that it shall not be necessary to the
proper execution of any conveyance affecting real property that the same
shall be executed under the seal of the grantor nor that any seal or scroll or
other mark be set opposite the name of the grantor. This statute, however,
does not do away with the necessity of the corporate seal being affixed to a
conveyance or encumbrance executed by a corporation. See 1935 C.S.A. Ch.
40, Sec. 39 and Ch. 41, Sec. 20.




SIGNATURES OF THOSE ACTING IN REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY. It often
happens that a person holding an interest in or lien on real estate in an
official or representative capacity omits to place following or below his sig-
nature to the instrument his official or representative designation, such as
"President," "T rustee," etc. Formerly this happened frequently in the execu-
tion by a private trustee of a release of a deed of trust through his omitting
to place the word "Trustee" after his signature. To correct this, 1927 S. L.
605, Sec. 45; 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Sec. 152, provides that, where from the
body of an instrument it is apparent that a person is conveying or is acting
in some official or representative capacity and the signature to the instrument
omits the statement of the official or representative capacity, it shall be pre-
sumed that the official or representative capacity is a part of the signature.
SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' CIVIL RELIEF ACT. The Soldiers' and Sailors'
Civil Relief Act of 1940, as amended, definitely is not a curative statute. In
fact, it has been the cause of much perplexity and doubt on the part of title
examiners. A reference to it in this article on curative statutes is necessary
because of its effect upon certain of the curative statutes herein discussed.
For discussions of its provisions with respect to real estate titles, reference
is made to the following articles which have appeared in DICTA: by L. A.
Hellerstein in the October and November 1940 issues; by the writer of this
article in the December 1940 issue; by Wim. Hedges Robinson, Jr. in the
November 1942 issue; and by Royal C. Rubright in the January 1944 issue.
Section 205 of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, as amended
in 1942, provides that the period of military service shall not be included
in computing any period then or thereafter to be limited by any law, regula-
tion or order for the bringing of any action or proceeding by or against any
person in military service or by or against his heirs, executors, administrators
or assigns and that no part of the period of military service which occurs
after the date of the enactment of the amendments of 1942 shall be included
in computing any period then or thereafter provided by any law for the re-
demption of real property sold or forfeited to enforce any obligation, tax or
assessment. Many of the curative statutes discussed in this article are in the
form of statutes of limitation upon the bringing of an action and therefore
they came within the provisions above mentioned of the Soldiers' and Sailors'
Civil Relief Act. The position taken by the Title Standards Committee of
the Denver Bar Association and approved by the Colorado Bar Association
at its annual convention on this point is stated in the following language
of the note to Title Standard No. 49, which was promulgated November 8,
1946 and relates to the sections discussed herein under the heading Liens-
Extinguishment of: "When Standard No. 24" (which was promulgated in
1942 and in which it was stated that, because of said provisions of the Sol-
diers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, an attorney should not, in reliance on
said sections, render an opinion showing title free and clear of an unreleased
encumbrance falling within such sections) "was first adopted we were actively
engaged in war, with millions in the service; however, more than a year has
passed since V-J Day, and under present conditions the Standard should be
amended and the Statute given full force and effect notwithstanding the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act". The policy expressed in the above
quotation has been followed by the Colorado attorneys generally by their
giving effect, in determining the merchantability of titles, to the various
curative statutes, even though they are in the form of statutes of limitation.
The customary practice of the attorneys generally of the community is a very
important factor in determining whether a title is merchantable. The cir-
cumstance that there is a possibility that the title may be held by a court to
be invalid because of a fact that does not appear on the face of the records
and is not known to exist does not necessarily mean that the title is unmer-
chantable; for example, a title may be perfect on the face of the records and
yet be bad as a matter of fact, because the signature to a deed was forged
or, even if it were the genuine signature of a person bearing that name, never-
theless that person was not the person of the same name to whom the prop-
erty had been conveyed, or the person who executed the deed was a minor
or a mental incompetent, or a deed which is on record had never been de-
livered; and yet, attorneys uniformly pass titles as merchantable in spite of
such possibilities. And, for the same reasons, with the fighting war over
more than four years ago and the personnel of the armed forces long since
reduced to a peace-time basis and the number of men and women in
military service reduced to an exceedingly small fraction of their num-
ber during the fighting war, the infinitesimal chance that someone claim-
ing an interest in the property may establish that his military service was
such as to prevent a curative statute in the form of a statute of limitation
from barring his claim should not require the rejection of the title as un-
merchantable.
SuccEssoRS IN TRUST. Prior to 1894, when the Public Trustee Act was
passed, deeds of trust were executed to private trustees. They usually named
as successor in trust, in the case of death, refusal or inability to serve, removal,
absence, etc., someone else, either a named individual or a designated public
official. And, even since the passage of the Public Trustee Act, the same prac-
tice has been followed with respect to trust deeds to private trustees. In
cases, particularly under old deeds of trust, where no public official was so
designated as successor and both the private trustee and the person named
as successor died or moved away or were absent or refused or were unable to
act and a release of the deed of trust or a foreclosure sale under it was
desired, there was no one who could legally execute the release or make the
sale. Because of this situation there was passed in 1915 a statute (1915 S. L.
478-479; 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Secs. 62 and 63) which provided that under the
circumstances .above mentioned the Public Trustee of the county in which
the property involved is located should accept and discharge the duties of
trustee or successor in trust under such trust deed at the request of any per-
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son interested in the property conveyed by it or the debt secured thereby
upon satisfactory proof of the death, absence, refusal or inability to act of
both the trustee and the successor in trust named in the trust deed; with the
further provision that he shall recite the fact of such death, absence, inability
or refusal to act in his trustee's deed or deed of release; and with the express
provision that the section should not apply to continuing offices or officers
named as trustees or successors in trust. And by 1927 S. L. 606, Sec. 48;
1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Sec. 155, it is provided that, upon the death of a sole
trustee or the surviving trustee of an express trust created by any written in-
strument affecting title to real roperty, the trust shall not descend to the
heirs of such trustee nor pass to his personal representative, but that the trust,
if then unexecuted, shall vest in the then Public Trustee and his successors
in office of the county wherein the real estate is situate, with all the powers
of the original trustee, except that, in cases where by law or by the instrument
a successor in trust is provided, the trust shall vest in such successor; with the
proviso that the District Court may upon application of any party in interest
appoint a new trustee.
TAX SALE CERTIFICATES, LIMITATION UPON. There often is shown in
an abstract a tax sale certificate issued many, many years before with no
redemption from the tax sale and no tax deed issued upon it. Its holder, in
most cases, did not care to pay the taxes falling due on the property each
year subsequent to its issuance and in practically every instance its owner
had, as a matter of fact, abandonedohis claims under it. However, it remained
on the records as an encumbrance on the property, even though it had been
abandoned for fifty years and, when an official certificate of taxes due was
secured from the Treasurer, it was shown thereon. There was no reason why
this condition should continue forever, any more than it should with respect
to unreleased mortgages and deeds of trust (see Liens-Extinguishment of).
And so there was enacted 1945 S. L. 671 which, as amended by 1947 S. L.
737-739, 1935 C.S.A. Suppl. Ch. 142, Sec. 211 (4), provided that no lien
upon real property created by tax certificates or certificates of purchase there-
tofore or thereafter issued by any County Treasurer on account of delinquent
taxes or assessments should remain a lien for a period longer than fifteen years
after the original issuance thereof and that no Treasurer's deed should issue
on any tax sale evidenced by any such certificate where it shall have ceased
to be a lien pursuant to the provisions of said statute and application for such
Treasurer's deed was not pending at the time of the expiration of the limita-
tion period provided by said statute. It further provided that all unredeemed
certificates upon which a tax deed had not been issued, which should have
been issued before the effective date of said statute and were fifteen or more
years old or would become fifteen years old before May 1, 1947 should re-
main in full force and effect until May 1, 1947, provided, however, that,
should the holder hereof commence proceedings to procure a tax deed by
making a demand upon County Treasurer for same on or before May 1, 1947,
his right to receive a tax deed should not be invalidated by the provisions of
the statute. It excepted from its provisions certificates issued to and held by
the county, city, city and county or district levying the tax on which the
certificate was issued, but, in the event of an assignment of such a cer-
tificate, its lien should cease fifteen years after its date of issuance; pro,
vided, however, that if the certificate was fifteen years old at the time of such
assignment or would become fifteen years old within one year from the date
of such assignment, the assignee should be entitled to a tax deed if proceed,
ings to procure a tax deed were instituted by making a demand upon the
County Treasurer for same within one year from the date of the assignment
by the county, city, city and county or district levying the tax. It further
required the County Treasurer, immediately upon the expiration of the lien
created by the certificate by reason of this statute, to issue a certificate of
cancellation and to present it to the Recorder who shall enter it in his tax
sale record and file it and it provided that such certificate of cancellation and
the record thereof shall be prima facie evidence of the cancellation of the tax
sale certificate and of the release of the lien thereof.
TAX SALES-REDEMPTION BY PERSONS UNDER LEGAL DISABILITY. 1935
C.S.A. Ch. 142, Sec. 265 allowed minors and mental incompetents to re-
deem from tax sales until the expiration of one year after the removal of
their respective disabilities and Section 274 of the same Chapter specified
the manner in which they should make the redemption. On the principle
that, in cases where a tax deed has been isued upon a tax sale, persons under
legal disability should not have any longer period in which to redeem from
the sale than they would have in which to bring an action to set. aside the
tax deed (see Decrees, Judgments and Official Deeds), the Legislature in
1947 enacted a statute (1947 S. L. 740-741, 1935 C.S.A. Suppl. Ch. 142,
Sec. 2'74) which amended said Section 274 so as to provide a limitation of
the period for redemption from tax sale by persons who are under legal dis-
ability at the time of the execution and delivery of the tax deed to nine years
from the date of the recording of such tax deed, with the provision that, if
the disability be removed or cease within such nine year period, the re-
demption must be asserted and take place within two years after the removal
or cessation of the disability, but that all redemptions under such statute
must take place within nine years of the recording of the tax deed, irrespective
of the time that the disability was removed. This statute further provided
that all persons against whom the new limitation created by the statute shall
have expired on the effective date of the statute or shall expire within six
months from such effective date may assert their rights of redemption within
six months from such effective date and not thereafter. Those who pre-
pared this amendment evidently overlooked repealing said Section 265 and
it is contemplated that a bill to repeal it will be introduced in the next
session of the Legislature. Such bill will probably also provide for the amend-
ment of Section 262 of the same Chapter (which is the five-year statute of
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limitations) so as to delete the provision which extends the period of limitation
of that statute, as to persons under legal disability, to one year after removal
of disability. This, of course, has nothing to do with the limitations provided
in 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Secs. 146 and 147 (see Decrees, Judgments and
Official Deeds), since the bar of either of said two statutes of limitation will
apply to any case falling within its provisions without regard to the pro-
visions of the other.
TITLE STANDARDS. Numerous references have been made in this article
to title standards. In 1941 a Committee on Real Estate Title Standards of
the Denver Bar Association was created and on February 2, 1942 that
committee was empowered by the association to promulgate and announce
such standards concerning the examination of abstracts of title as from time
to time may be approved by the committee. Such committee, under the
capable and intelligent chairmanship of Edwin J. Wittelshofer, has issued
up to this time a total of sixty-two title standards. Each standard sets out
a problem which not infrequently is encountered by Colorado attorneys in
examining titles and gives the answer of the committee thereto. Most of
the local bar associations in Colorado outside of Denver have, from time
to time as they have been promulgated by the Denver committee, approved
and adopted these standards. In addition thereto, upon the recommendation
of the Real Estate Title Standards Committee of the Colorado Bar Associa-
tion, of which committee, also, Mr. Wittelshofer has been the chairman since
its creation, the Colorado Bar Association has at its annual convention each
year adopted the title standards promulgated by the Denver committee
during the preceding year, so that all of the sixty-two standards issued up to
this time are standards both of the Denver Bar Association and of the Colo-
rado Bar Association. These standards have been of great assistance to at-
torneys throughout the state in establishing, through voluntary acceptance
of them by the attorneys, uniform practice with regard to the various prob-
lems covered by them. No small part of such voluntary acceptance of the
the standards by the attorneys has been due to the fact that the Denver
committee, in choosing the problems to be covered by the standards which it
issues, has been careful to select only those problems its answers to which the
committee felt confident could be successfully maintained in the courts.
TRUST DEEDS MERELY LIENS. Until 1934, when it used language to the
contrary (Wright v. Halley, 95 Colo. 148, 151-152, 33 Pac. (2d) 966;
Tolland Co. v. First State Bank of Keenesburg, 95 Colo. 321, 324-325, 35
Pac. (2d) 867), our Supreme Court had held in numerous cases that deeds
of trust (meaning deeds of trust to private trustees executed before the pass-
age of the Public Trustee Act in 1894 and deeds of trust to the Public
Trustee executed thereafter) did not merely create liens but constituted con-
veyances of the legal title to real estate. Stephens v. Clay, 17 Colo. 489, 491,
30 Pac. 43; Reid v. Sullivan, 20 Colo. 498, 502, 39 Pac. 338; Belmont Min-
ing & Milling Co. v. Costigan, 21 Colo. 471, 479, 42 Pac. 647; Holmquist v.
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Gilbert, 41 Colo. 113, 118, 92 Pac. 232; Foot v. Burr, 41 Colo. 192, 198, 92
Pac. 236; and Bankers Building & Loan Association v. Fleming Brothers Lum-
ber Co., 83 Colo. 335, 338, 264 Pac. 1087. Some of the complications re-
sulting from these holdings are mentioned under the heading Releases of
Trust Deeds-To Whom Made herein. It was felt that there should be no
more reason for a deed of trust to be deemed to constitute a conveyance of
the legal title any more than for a mortgage to do so and that the intention
of the parties to a deed of trust is merely to create a lien to secure an indebted-
ness. Accordingly there was passed in 1927 a statute (1927 S. L. 592, Sec.
12; 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Sec. 118) providing that mortgages, trust deeds or
other instruments intended to secure the payment of an obligation affecting
title to or an interest in real property shall not be deemed a conveyance, re-
gardless of their terms, so as to enable the owner of the obligation secured to
recover possession of real property without foreclosure and sale, but the same
shall be deemed a lien.
TRUSTEES. Very often there appears in the chain of title a deed to a
certain person followed by the word "Trustee." Under the decisions, this
placed everyone dealing with the property upon notice that the grantee ac-
quired and held the title only in a fiduciary capacity and put anyone dealing
with the property upon inquiry as to who were the beneficiaries and what
were the terms of the trust. Very often the grantee did not in reality hold
the property in a fiduciary capacity, but acquired it for himself alone and for
reasons of his own had the word "Trustee" added to his name. And, even
where the grantee did acquire the property in a fiduciary capacity, in a large
number of cases there was no way of placing upon the records in a satisfactory
form evidence as to who were the beneficiaries and the terms of the trust,
especially where the grantee acquired it for the benefit of others (including
often associates of his in the enterprise) who were not named in the deed and
there was no written instrument ever executed by the parties evidencing the
arrangement or naming the beneficiaries or the terms of the arrangement.
In such cases there was no way of making the title good except by a suit to
quiet title. To correct, this, in 1921 there was passed a statute (1921 S. L.
187, Secs. 1 and 2; 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Secs. 9 and 10) which provided
that all instruments conveying real estate or interests therein in which the
grantee is described as Trustee, Agent, Executor, etc., or in any other repre-
sentative capacity, shall name the beneficiary or beneficiaries so represented
and define the trust or other agreement under which the grantee is acting
or refer by proper description to book, page, etc., to an instrument of public
record in the county in which the land is located in which such matters shall
appear and that otherwise the description of a grantee in any such represen-
tative capacity in such conveyance shall be considered and held a description
of the person only and shall not be notice of a trust or other representative
capacity of such grantee; with the further provision in the second section that
unless, within five years after the sections became effective, there was filed for
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record in such county, so that such record shall appear in the chain of title to
the land, a statement duly verified setting forth the name of the beneficiary
or beneficiaries and defining the terms of the trust or other agreement estab-
lishing the representative relaticnship or referring by proper description to an
instrument of public record in such county in which such matters shall ap-
pear, then, at the expiration of such five years, instruments of the kind men-
tioned in the preceding section, which shall have been executed prior to the
time such sections became effective, shall cease to be notice of such trust or
representative capacity of the grantee and shall be considered and held to be
a description of the person of the grantee only. In Beatty v. Fellows, 101
Colo. 466, 470, 74 Pac. (2d) 677, our Supreme Court held that the addition
of the word "Trustee" to the name of the grantee in a deed signified nothing,
in view of this statute, and that under this statute the word was purely de-
scription of the person.
UNRECORDED INSTRUMENTS-AGAINST WHOM INVALID. Prior to 1927
the statute (1921 Comp. Laws, Sec. 4902) provided that instruments affect-
ing title to real estate from and after the filing thereof for record, and not
before, shall take effect "as to subsequent bona fide purchasers and incum-
brancers by mortgage, judgment or otherwise not having notice thereof." It
was held in Carroll v. Kit Carson Land Company, 24 Colo. App. 217, 133
Pac. 148 and Brackett v. McClure, 24 Colo. App. 524, 135 Pac. 1110, that,
where there were two chains of alleged title to a piece of real estate, such
as the fee simple title deraigned from the United States and a tax title, those
acquiring claims under one chain were not "bona fide purchasers and incum-
brancers" as against those claiming under the other chain under such statute
and that therefore one claiming title under one of the chains could not take
any advantage under such statute of the failure of one claiming title under
the other chain to record the instrument through which he claimed such title.
These decisions were based upon previous holdings of the Appellate Courts
of Colorado cited in the first of these cases that: "A deed duly recorded is
constructive notice of its existence, and of its contents, to all persons claiming
what is thereby conveyed under the same grantor by subsequent purchase or
mortgage, but not to other persons. * * * Such record is constructive notice
only to those who are bound to search for it as subsequent purchasers and
mortgagees, and all others who deal with it on the credit of the title in the
line of which the recorded deed belongs." In the two decisions of the Court
of Appeals which have been cited it was held that a decree in a suit to quiet
title in favor of the holder of the tax title did not affect one holding the title
deraigned from the United States, the conveyance to whom was not recorded
and who had not been made a party to the suit. And in the Carroll case it was
further held that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to
lis pendens did not apply as against one claiming under a different chain of
title than the chain under which the party filing the lis pendens claimed. The
effect of these decisions was to prevent a decree purporting to quiet a tax
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title from making a merchantable title because, although everyone who,
according to the records, owned any interest in or lien upon the original title
was made a party, nevertheless it might afterward develop that a deed con-
veying the original title or an encumbrance upon the original title had been
executed and not recorded and in such case the decree would be ineffective
as to the grantee or encumbrancer under the unrecorded instrument. As the
result there were passed in 1927 two sections (1927 S. L. 590, Secs. 8 and 9;
1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, Secs. 114, 115). The first of these sections provides
that all instruments affecting title to real property may be recorded in the
office of the Recorder of the county where such real property is situated and
that no such instrument shall be valid as against any class of persons with any
kind of rights, except between the parties thereto, and such as have notice
thereof, until the same shall be deposited with such Recorder. The second
of these sections provides that the filing of notice of pendency of an action
in compliance with law shall, from time of the filing thereof, be notice to all
persons who may subsequently acquire any right, title, interest or estate in
and to the real property described in such notice from any grantor or from
any source whatsoever. Said Section 8 (Section 114 of C.S.A.) was before
the Colorado Supreme Court for consideration in Moore v. Chalmers-Galloway
Livestock Company, 90 Colo. 548, 10 Pac. (2d) 950, and its validity, consti-
tutionality and applicability were sustained by the Court in that case as
against one claiming under a different chain of title whose conveyance was
executed eight years before the passage of the new statute and was not re-
corded during such eight years or during the period of almost two years after
the passage of the new statute.
USE RESTRICTIONS. See Building and Use Restrictions.
VACATIONS OF ROADWAYS. Occasionally an attorney was compelled to
object to the title to land which had been dedicated to public use as a street,
alley or road on the ground that the purported vacation of same did not
comply with the technical requirements of our statutes, even though the land
had not been used as a roadway for many years and even had been enclosed,
with adjoining land, by fences. In 1949 the Legislature enacted 1949 S. L. 620-
623 which contained provisions specifying the persons in whom the title to
the land included in roadways should vest under various circumstances upon
the vacation of such roadways and the manner in which such vacation should
be made. Such statute also provided that any written instrument of vacation,
or a resubdivision plat purporting to vacate or relocate roadways or portions
thereof, which has remained or shall have remained of record in the county
where the roadway is situate for a period of seven years shall be prima facie
evidence of an effective vacation of such former roadways. It further pro-
vided that the foregoing shall not apply during the pendency of an action
commenced prior to the expiration of said seven years to set aside, modify
or annul the vacation, or when the vacation has been set aside, modified
or annulled by proper order or decree of a competent court and notice of
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pendency ot action or a certified copy of such decree has been recorded in
the Recorder's office of the county where the property is located. Such statute
further provided that any limitation established by it shall apply to causes
of action which accrued prior to its effective date as well as those accruing
thereafter, provided, however, that the right to institute an action shall not
be barred by reason of such limitation until the expiration of six months from
said effective date.
WILLS-POWERS OF SALE UNDER. In the absence of a statute to the
contrary, a power of sale of real estate conferred by will upon an executor
cannot be exercised by an administrator with the will annexed unless by the
terms of the will the sale of the real estate is mandatory and not discretionary.
Because of this there was passed, as a part of the revision made in 1903 of
the statutes relating to administration of estates, a section (1903 S. L. 504,
Sec. 91; 1908 Rev. Stat. Sec. 7167) providing that whenever any testator
shall by his last will direct that his real estate or any of it be sold or other-
wise disposed of for the payment of his debts or for any other purpose, and
no executor be named therein or if the executor named therein refuse such
office or be removed or die, the administrator with the will annexed or
de bonis non may sell, convey and dispose of such real estate in accordance
with the provisions of such will in the same manner and with like effect as.
the executor in such will and duly qualified might have done. It will be
noted that in the early part of this section appeared the words, "shall, by his
last will, direct that his real estate, or any of it, be sold or otherwise disposed
of." Because of this titles were very often objected to because the will did
not direct the sale of the real estate in question but merely authorized the
sale of the real estate by the executor. By reason thereof the section was
amended (1921 S. L. 821, 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 176, Sec. 156) so as to change
the words hereinbefore quoted to "shall, by his last will, confer power for
the sale of his real estate, or any of it, or for its disposition otherwise." In
1947 this section was further amended (1947 S. L. 943, Sec. 11, 1935 C.S.A.
Suppl. Ch. 176, Sec. 156) by adding the words "resident or non-resident"
and "in the State of Colorado" so as to leave no doubt as to it being applica-
ble to the estates of non-resident testators as well as to estates of resident
testators. This section and 1949 S. L. 769-770, See. 16 (which amended
1935 C.S.A. Ch. 176, Sec. 62 (d)) relating to the execution of conveyances,
encumbrances and contracts by the personal representative or trustee ap-
pointed by a court of another state under a will admitted to probate in that
state are the basis of Title Standards Nos. 57 and 58.
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